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A segmented markets model is constructed in which transactions are con-
ducted using credit and currency. Goods market segmentation plays an impor-
tant role, in addition to the role played by conventional segmentation of asset
markets. An important novelty of the paper is to show how the diﬀusion of
a money injection by the central bank depends not only on the interaction of
agents in exchanging money for goods, but on the arrangements for clearing and
settlement of credit instruments. The model permits open market operations,
daylight overdrafts, reserve-holding, and overnight lending and borrowing, al-
lowing us to consider a rich array of central banking arrangements and their
implications.
11. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we explore the implications of a tractable segmented markets model
with credit and cash transactions, and with a rich array of possible central banking
arrangements. As in traditional segmented markets models, this model has limited
participation in particular asset markets, but a key element of the model is the seg-
mentation of goods markets. The model permits open market operations, consumer
credit transactions, daylight overdrafts, reserve-holding, overnight lending and bor-
rowing, and clearing and settlement of consumer credit transactions. In the model,
the transmission of monetary policy is in part determined by the rate of diﬀusion of
a central bank money injection through the economy. In turn, this rate of diﬀusion
depends ﬁrst on the pattern of exchanges of cash and credit for goods, and second
on the nature of arrangements for clearing and settlement of credit instruments. We
explore the implications of diﬀerent vehicles for accomplishing a central bank money
injection, i.e. daylight overdrafts and open market operations. Further, we examine
the implications of the payment of interest on reserves.
This model builds on Williamson (2006), which is a pure-currency framework where
injections of outside money into the economy occur by way of lump-sum transfers. An
important feature of that model is that there are two kinds of households, those who
are connected, and those who are unconnected. Connected households can trade on
asset markets, while unconnected households cannot. Further, and this is a novelty
in that model, connected and unconnected households have “proximity” to diﬀerent
sets of goods markets, and this is critical to how monetary policy works. A Friedman
rule for monetary policy is suboptimal, and an anticipated inﬂation eﬀect on nominal
interest rates tends to reinforce the liquidity eﬀect, so that nominal interest rates
are more volatile than in conventional segmented markets models. Monetary shocks
have small eﬀects on aggregate real quantities, but can have quantitatively important
2distributional eﬀects.
This paper is related to the literature on asset market segmentation and monetary
policy. One branch of the market segmentation literature is concerned with the devel-
opment of general equilibrium versions of Tobin (1956) and Baumol (1952). In these
models, some fraction of the population is engaged, or chooses to engage in, asset
transactions at any point in time, and thus central bank actions in asset markets will
initially directly aﬀect only this “participating” population. A monetary injection by
the central bank causes a redistribution of wealth which will in general result in short
run changes in asset prices, employment, output, and the distribution of consumption
across the population. The ﬁrst models of this type were constructed by Grossman
and Weiss (1983) and Rotemberg (1984). Later contributions include Alvarez and
Atkeson (1997), and Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2002), Alvarez, Atkeson and Ed-
mond (2002), Chiu (2004) and Khan and Thomas (2005). Much, though not all, of
this literature focusses on asset pricing implications, and a key feature of all these
models is that all economic agents (participating or not) purchase goods in a single
goods market.
Another related class of models deals with market segmentation in a representative
household construct, and includes work by Lucas (1990), Fuerst (1992), and Chris-
tiano and Eichenbaum (1995). Fuerst’s model, from which Christiano and Eichen-
buam’s is developed, obtains a nonneutrality of money through a cash-in-advance
constraint faced by ﬁrms that applies to the purchase of labor services. This is quite
diﬀerent from what occurs in Tobin-Baumol-type models with endogenous labor sup-
ply.
Recent research in monetary theory is aimed at developing models of monetary
economies that capture heterogeneity and the distribution of wealth in a manner that
is tractable for analytical and quantitative work. One approach is to use a quasi-
linear utility function as in Lagos and Wright (2005), an approach that, under some
3circumstances, will lead to the result that economic agents optimally redistribute
money balances uniformly among themselves whenever they have the opportunity.
Another approach is to use a representative household with many agents, as in Shi
(1997), in which (also see Lucas 1990) there can be redistributions of wealth within
the household during the period, but these distribution eﬀects do not persist. Work
by Williamson (2005) and Shi (2004) uses the quasi-linear-utility and representative-
household approaches, respectively, to study some implications of limited participa-
tion for optimal monetary policy, interest rates, and output. Other related work is
Head and Shi (2003), and Head and Lapham (2005).
In the model constructed here, each household consists of a producer and a con-
tinuum of consumers. The consumers purchase goods in diﬀerent markets, but are
more likely to buy from households of their own type (connected or unconnected).
Goods are purchased with credit, and these debts must be settled within the period.
However, some debts are settled more quickly than others. If debt is settled quickly,
then sales of goods can be used to ﬁnance other purchases by the household within
the period. Otherwise, if goods are sold by a household in exchange for credit instru-
ments that do not settle quickly, then the receipts from these sales cannot be spent
until the following period.
A connected household can borrow and lend on bond markets (one-period and
within-period), and the central bank also borrows and lends in these markets. If a
period is interpreted as one day, then the central bank can engage in actions that can
be interpreted as the extension of daylight overdrafts and intervention in the overnight
credit market. Connected households hold outside money as reserve accounts with
the central bank, and the central bank has the option of paying interest on these
reserves. Unconnected households cannot borrow and lend in bond markets, and
they hold outside money in the form of currency.
In general, connected and unconnected households sell goods at diﬀerent prices in
4equilibrium. Further, a consumer pays a premium in a goods purchase where the debt
exchanged for the goods takes longer to clear. A monetary shock not only produces a
liquidity eﬀe c t ,b u ti ta ﬀects relative prices. That is, a positive money shock tends to
reduce the nominal interest rate, increase the relative price of goods sold by connected
households, and reduce the relative price of goods exchanged for debt that takes a
long time to clear.
In Section 2 we set up the model, while in Section 3 we set up the optimization
problems of households and show how to construct an equilibrium. In Section 4 we
determine the properties of an equilibrium. Section 5 is a conclusion.
2. THE MODEL
T h e r ei sac o n t i n u u mo fi n ﬁnitely-lived households with unit mass indexed by i ∈
[0,1]. Each household consists of a producer and a continuum of consumers with unit
mass, with a consumer indexed by (i,j),w i t hj uniformly distributed on the interval















where t indexes time, 0 <β<1,c i
t(j) is the consumption of consumer j who is a
member household i, and ni
t is the labor supply of the producer from household i.
Assume that v(·) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly convex, with v0(0) =
0 and v0(∞)=∞. The producer can supply an unlimited quantity of labor, and each
unit of labor supplied yields one unit of the perishable consumption good.
Each household resides at a separate location. There is a fraction α of connected
households, where 0 <α<1. Connected households hold outside money as reserve
accounts with the central bank, and also can trade on bond markets. Each connected
household has M1
0 units of outside money at the beginning of period 0. The remaining
fraction 1−α of households are unconnected, in that they hold outside money in the
5form of divisible ﬁat currency and do not trade on bond markets. Each unconnected
household has M2
0 units of outside money in period 0.
There is an absence-of-double-coincidence problem in this economy. Each house-
hold produces a distinct good, and the good that is produced by the producer in a
household is not consumed by any of the consumers in that household. At the begin-
ning of the period, each consumer in the household receives a preference shock, which
determines the good that consumer wishes to consume during the period. Each con-
sumer then travels to the location of the household that produces his or her desired
good, purchases some quantity of that good (details of the exchange will be described
later), consumes, and then returns home. A given consumer cannot visit more than
one location, in addition to his or her home location, during a period.
For a consumer in a connected household, the probability that the consumer’s de-
sired good during the current period will be one sold by a connected household is
1−(1−α)π and the probability that the desired good will be sold by an unconnected
household is (1−α)π. For a consumer from an unconnected household, the probability
of that the consumer’s desired good during the period is produced by an unconnected
household is 1 − απ, and the probability is απ that the consumer’s desired good is
produce by a connected household. For any consumer, the probability distribution
for desired goods, conditional on the desired good being produced by a connected or
unconnected household, is uniform. These meeting probabilities guarantee that the
ﬂows of consumers going from connected to unconnected households, and from un-
connected to connected households, are equal each period. The parameter π governs
the interaction between connected households and unconnected households as groups.
That is, if π<1 then the population of consumers arriving at a connected location
will have a greater proportion of consumers from connected locations than would be
observed arriving at an unconnected location, and similarly for unconnected loca-
tions. If π =1 , then the population of consumers is identical across locations when
6consumers go shopping.
At the beginning of period t, consumers receive their preference shocks, and then
purchase goods from the appropriate households with credit. That is, consumers ex-
change IOUs for goods, and the IOUs are settled during the period. For the purposes
of clearing and settling IOUs, there are N clearinghouses, indexed by k =1 ,2,...,N,
and each clearinghouse has 1
N households as members. Clearinghouse membership
is determined at random, so that each clearinghouse has a mass of 1
N households as
members, and for a given clearinghouse the fraction of connected member households
is α. Let γ ≡ 1
N.
When consumers arrive to purchase goods from a producer in a household, the
producer can determine in which cases the consumer’s and producer’s clearinghouses
are the same, and in which cases these clearinghouses are diﬀerent. The law of large
numbers implies that each household will be selling to a fraction γ of consumers who
have the same clearinghouse membership, and to a fraction 1−γ whose clearinghouse
membership is diﬀerent. In general, goods will be sold at diﬀerent prices to the two
diﬀerent groups of consumers, so that there are eﬀectively two diﬀerent markets for
goods on which each individual household producer sells.
After households receive IOUs in exchange for the goods they have produced, the
IOUs are sent to the appropriate clearinghouse; that is, an IOU issued by a particular
household goes to the clearinghouse of which that household is a member. Thus, all of
the IOUs issued by a household’s consumers will at this point ﬁnd their way back to
the household’s clearinghouse, and will represent debits on the household’s account
with its own clearinghouse, and the house h o l dw i l lh a v er e c e i v e ds o m eI O U sf r o m
other household’s that are also members of its clearinghouse, and these IOUs will
constitute credits on the household’s account with its clearinghouse. The household
will also have submitted IOUs to clearinghouses of which it is not a member, and will
therefore have credits against these other clearinghouses. At this point, settlement
7among clearinghouses takes place, and connected households and the central bank
trade assets.
The sequence of events is as follows. First, connected households and the central
bank trade assets, then each household settles its account with its own clearinghouse in
outside money. For connected households this involves a transfer of reserve balances,
and for unconnected households a transfer of currency. Next, each household settles
with all other clearinghouses in a similar manner.
In the asset market on which connected households and the central bank trade,
there are three assets: reserve balances, within-period nominal bonds, and one-period
nominal bonds. In period t, a within-period bond sells for one unit of reserve balances
and is a claim to rt units of reserve balances at the end of the period, while a one-
period bond sells for one unit of reserve balances in period t and pays oﬀ Rt+1 units
of reserve balances in period t+1. One interpretation of these arrangements is that a
period is one day, borrowing by a household within the period is a daylight overdraft
with the central bank, and overnight borrowing and lending can be accomplished
through combinations of within-period and one-period borrowing and lending.
The key consequences of these payments arrangements can be summarized in the
constraints faced by households, which will diﬀer somewhat depending on whether
the household is connected or unconnected. We will consider equilibria where prices
depend only on the method of payment and whether the seller of the good is a
connected or unconnected household. Let p1
t and q1
t denote the prices at which a
producer from a connected household sells when payment is made with an IOU that is
cleared through the household’s clearinghouse, or another clearinghouse, respectively.
Similarly, p2
t and q2
t are the prices at which an unconnected household sells. The ﬁrst
8constraint faced by the household is a ﬁnance constraint,w h i c hi s
























t + Rtbt − τ1t
In constraint (2), c11
t denotes the consumption of consumers from the connected house-
hold who buy from another connected household with a clearinghouse in common and
p1
t is the money price of those goods, while c12
t is what is consumed by the consumers




t denote what is consumed by consumers from a con-
nected household who buy from connected and unconnected households respectively,
but do not share a clearinghouse with the seller, and q1
t and q2
t are the corresponding
prices. As well, bt is the quantity of one-period nominal bonds acquired by the house-
hold in period t − 1,f t is the quantity of within-period nominal bonds purchased by
the household, and m1
t is the household’s beginning-of-period money balances. Here,
it denotes the gross nominal interest rate on reserve balances held from the end of
period t to the beginning of period t+1(i.e. overnight). Finally, x1
t is the quantity of
goods sold by the household’s producer to consumers who are members of the same
clearinghouse, and τ1t is a nominal lump-sum tax paid to the government. Thus, con-
straint (2) states that total household expenditure on goods and nominal bonds must
be ﬁnanced by the money balances with which the household begins the period, plus
the IOUs acquired from consumers who share a clearinghouse with the household.
A connected household must satisfy its budget constraint, which is






























t + Rtbt + rtft − τ1t − τ2t
9In constraint (3) m1
t+1is the quantity of money carried by the household into the next
period, y1
t i st h eq u a n t i t yo fg o o d ss o l dt oc o n s u m e r sw h od on o th a v eac l e a r i n g h o u s e
in common with the household, rtft denotes the total nominal payoﬀ on within-period
bonds, and τ2t is a nominal lump-sum transfer paid to the government.
A key feature of the environment is that income earned by the household from
the sale of goods for IOUs which clear on the second round of settlement cannot be
spent until the following period. That is, constraint (2) is a type of cash-in-advance
constraint.






















































Note that, in contrast to the connected household, the unconnected household does
not trade bonds, receives no government transfers, and does not receive interest on
its outside money balances, which are in the form of currency.
There are a number of restrictions in this model on the types of assets that can
be traded, and who can trade these assets. First, contingent claims markets are ab-
sent. As we will see, in the equilibria that we examine, all connected households
will be identical, and all unconnected households will be identical, but connected
and unconnected households would want to trade contingent claims if they could.
However, the only interaction between these households is in meetings between con-
sumers and households. It is assumed that anonymity holds in these meetings, i.e. as
agents cannot be identiﬁed, contingent claims contracts cannot be enforced. Further,
clearinghouses are not able to verify particular contingencies and so they cannot act
as contingent-claim intermediaries. Second, unconnected households cannot trade
10bonds, and bonds (at least some of them) cannot be used in settlement. Since bonds
must be purchased with reserve balances, the payoﬀs are in reserve balances, and un-
connected households cannot hold reserve balances, these households therefore cannot
hold bonds either. We assume that the government prohibits the issue of liabilities
that have the features of government-issued ﬁat currency, and so bonds cannot be
intermediated and used in transactions. Constraint (2) could be relaxed if a house-
hold’s clearinghouse would accept the IOUs of non-member households in settlement.
However, we assume that a clearinghouse does not have the means to verify the
authenticity of IOUs other than the ones issued by its members.




0 +( 1− α)M
2
0 =1 ,
and there are initially no outstanding government bonds. As well, all interest on
government bonds in periods 1,2,... is ﬁnanced by the lump-sum transfers, so that
the aggregate quantity of nominal government liabilities is ﬁxed at unity forever. Our
principal concern is in determining the eﬀects of changes in the the composition of
the government’s debt, i.e. the eﬀects of monetary policy. Let M1
t (M2
t ) denote the
stock of money per capita supplied to connected (unconnected) households at the
beginning of period t, Bt the quantity of one-period government bonds per connected
household maturing in period t, and Ft the quantity of within-period government











where B0 =0 . The lump-sum taxes that ﬁn a n c ei n t e r e s to nt h eg o v e r n m e n td e b ta r e
levied in such a way as to have no distributional consequences, that is




τ2t =( rt − 1)Ft (8)
The government chooses it,B t+1,F t, τ1t, and τ2t at the beginning of period t, possibly
in a random fashion. The gross interest rates Rt and rt are then market-determined,
and (6), (7), and (8) then determine the total quantity of aggregate outside money
in period t +1on the left-hand side of (6).
3. OPTIMIZATION AND EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, our goals are to characterize the solution to the households’ opti-
mization problems, and impose equilibrium conditions.
For a connected household, given the household’s objective function (1) and its
constraints (2) and (3), and assuming an interior solution (which we must have in












































t denotes the multiplier associated with the household’s ﬁnance constraint
(2). In (9), the log utility functions of consumers imply that the household will
equalize expenditures across the household’s consumers at the optimum. This will give













































































Next, in equilibrium the market clears for goods sold in connected locations for
IOUs that clear early,
γ{[1 − (1 − α)π]c
11
t +( 1− α)πc
21
t } = x
1
t, (14)
for goods sold in connected locations for IOUs that clear late,
(1 − γ){[1 − (1 − α)π]d
11
t +( 1− α)πd
21
t } = y
1
t (15)
















Finally, asset markets clear, that is










In this section, given the characterization of a competitive equilibrium from the
previous section, we obtain some results concerning prices and the eﬀects of open
market operations.
First, note from (9) and (12) that, pi
t = qi





and only if λ
i
t > 0, for i =1 ,2. Therefore, a consumer will pay a premium if he or
she purchases goods with IOUs that clear late, if and only if the ﬁnance constraint
13binds. That is, so long as there is a binding ﬁnance constraint, then all income
received by the household from the sale of goods for early-clearing IOUs is spent in
the current period. However, income received from selling goods in exchange for late
clearing IOUs cannot be spent until the following period. Therefore, the household







where rt is the gross nominal interest rate on within-period bonds. Therefore, the
within-period nominal interest rate is greater than zero if and only if consumers pay
a premium when they make a purchase with a late-clearing IOU, i.e. if and only if
the ﬁnance constraint binds for connected households.
We will assume for now (and check this later) that the ﬁnance constraints (2) and
(4) always bind. Then, letting z1
t (z2
t) denote nominal expenditure in period t by a



















From (9), (12), (14), and (16), nominal expenditures in connected and unconnected





t = γ{[1 − (1 − α)π]z
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t +( 1− απ)z
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t] (23)











[1 − γ(1 − απ)][M1
t + Bt − Bt+1 − Ft]+( 1− α)πγM2
t






t + Bt − Bt+1 − Ft]+{1 − γ[1 − (1 − α)π]}M2
t
[1 − γ(1 − π)]
(25)
In (24) and (25), note that M1
t + Bt − Bt+1 − Ft is the quantity of outside money
available to a connected household at the beginning of period t after the the gov-
ernment makes asset trades, while M2
t is the quantity of outside money available to
an unconnected household. Then, (24) shows that the nominal expenditures by a
connected household on goods purchased with IOUs that clear late, (1−γ)z1
t, equals
a weighted average of the quantities of outside money available to connected and
unconnected households. That is, when consumers from an unconnected household
make purchases from a connected household, some of the receipts of the connected
household are available to spend during the period. Since nominal expenditure by
unconnected households will tend to increase with M2
t , therefore nominal expendi-
ture by connected households will tend to increase with M2
t as well, as we see in (24).
Note that the weight on M2
t in equation (24) is increasing in (1 − α)π, the fraction
of consumers buying from a connected household who come from an unconnected
household. As well, the weight on M2
t in equation (24) is increasing in γ, the fraction
of goods transactions that are settled early in the period. Equation (25) shows a
similar relationship to (25) for an unconnected household rather than a connected
one.
Next, we can determine the quantities of money per household in each location in
period t +1 . Given that the ﬁnance constraints (2) and (4) bind, from (2)-(5), (6),




















t + Bt − Bt+1 −
(1 − α)π[M1
t + Bt − Bt+1 − Ft − M2
t ]








t + Bt − Bt+1 − Ft − M2
t ]
[1 − γ(1 − π)]
. (27)
Equations (26) and (27) show that, if the quantity of outside money available to
spend per connected households is greater than the quantity available per unconnected
households, then money will ﬂow from connected to unconnected households, and
vice-versa. Note, in equations (26) and (27) that money ﬂows are larger the larger is
π and the larger is γ. That is, π and γ determine the speed of diﬀusion of an outside
money injection by the central bank, which can occur either through an open market
purchase (Bt − Bt+1) or a daylight overdraft (−Ft). The parameter π governs the
degree to which households purchase goods from other households of the same type.





t + Bt − Bt+1)+( 1− α)M
2
t +( 1− α)Ft = M
2
t+1 − Ft
The parameter γ i st h ef r a c t i o no fg o o d st r a n s a c t i o n sv o l u m et h a tc l e a r se a r l yi nt h e
period, so that an increase in γ also speeds diﬀusion. Setting γ =1in (26) and (27)
gives the same result as setting π =1 , i.e. diﬀusion occurs in one period. However,
the economy with γ =1i so n ew h e r eo u t s i d em o n e yi sn o tn e e d e da sam e d i u mo f
exchange.




t denote total nominal expendi-
ture on the goods produced by a connected and unconnected household, respectively.
From (24) and (25) we get
ψ
1
t =[ 1 − (1 − α)π]z
1




[1 − γ(1 − π) − (1 − α)π](M1
t + Bt − Bt+1 − Ft)+( 1− α)πM2
t










t + Bt − Bt+1 − Ft)+[ 1− γ(1 − π) − απ]M2
t
(1 − γ)[1 − γ(1 − π)]




























































and (32) and (33) solve for x2
t and y2
t. Further, from (9) and (11) nominal interest

















A monetary policy is a stochastic process for {Bt+1,F t,i t+1}∞




t + Bt − Bt+1 − Ft > 0
and
1 ≤ it+1 ≤ Rt+1













t}, which is an exogenous stochastic process. Then, the mathematics
involved in the solution is very simple. Equations (30) and (31) solve jointly for x1
t
17and y1
t, equations (32) and (33) solve jointly for x2
t and y2
t (34) solves for Rt+1 and






















, for i,j =1 ,2.
5. CONCLUSION
We have constructed a tractable model where there are alternative payments arrange-
ments for purchasing goods, and where the central bank can use diﬀerent vehicles to
inject outside money into the private economy. All goods are purchased with IOUs,
but some IOUs clear more quickly than others. As a result, outside money is useful
in settling debts. However, only connected households can borrow and lend on bond
markets and hold outside money as reserve balances with the central bank.
Because of goods market segmentation, prices are in general diﬀerent in diﬀerent
markets, and a central bank money injection will aﬀect relative prices in the short run
across goods markets. Further, consumers pay a premium in a goods purchase if the
IOU with which the good is purchased does not clear quickly. Thus, in a particular
market, prices depend on the payment instrument used, and relative prices in any
given market change in response to a money injection.
T h er a t eo fd i ﬀusion of a money injection through the economy determines the
persistence in the eﬀects of monetary policy and its quantitative initial impact. The
rate of diﬀusion increases as the probability that diﬀerent types of households trade
increases, and it change with the arrangements for clearing and settling credit instru-
ments.
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